Textbooks

• Börgers, T. — An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015). Clear graduate-level textbook on mechanism design theory.
• Roth, A. E. — Who Gets What — and Why (2015). Accessible introduction to market design (matching, auctions, kidney exchange).
• Krishna, V. — Auction Theory (2010). Comprehensive treatment of auction formats and their properties.
• Milgrom, P. — Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (2017). Modern auction design for spectrum and beyond.
• Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. — Microeconomic Theory (1995). Standard reference for the theoretical foundations.

Tutorials & Courses

• Market Design course (Al Roth, Stanford) — Lecture materials on practical market design.
• Tim Roughgarden's Algorithmic Game Theory lectures — CS-oriented mechanism design.

Key Concepts

• Incentive compatibility — agents do best by reporting truthfully.
• The revelation principle — any mechanism's outcome can be replicated by a direct, truthful mechanism.
• Matching markets — two-sided markets (school choice, residency matching, organ exchange).
• Metrology — the science of measurement, critical for defining what incentive mechanisms measure and reward.