Textbooks

• Moulin, H. — Fair Division and Collective Welfare (2003). Formal treatment of how to aggregate preferences fairly.
• Arrow, K. J. — Social Choice and Individual Values (1951). The foundational impossibility result for preference aggregation.
• Brandt, F., Conitzer, V., Endriss, U., Lang, J., & Procaccia, A. — Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016). Comprehensive reference on computational approaches to voting and preference aggregation.
• Sen, A. — Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1970; expanded ed. 2017). How to reason about social welfare, equity, and rights within formal frameworks — the other foundational text alongside Arrow.
• Fishburn, P. C. — The Theory of Social Choice (1973). Systematic treatment of voting rules and their properties.

Tutorials & Courses

• Voting Theory Primer — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy overview.
• Eric Pacuit's course notes on social choice — Accessible graduate-level introduction.

Key Concepts

• Condorcet cycles — when majority preferences are intransitive.
• Strategyproofness — mechanisms where truthful reporting is optimal.
• Deliberative polling — combining deliberation with preference measurement.
• Generative social choice — using language models to find novel aggregations of expressed preferences.