← Back to grid
Existing Human Institutions › Dyadic › Preferences
Negotiation between parties

How humans solve this today

When two people negotiate on each other's behalf (a real-estate agent, a divorce lawyer, a procurement officer), the practice has a few load-bearing features. Negotiators carry an explicit mandate from their principal (a price range, a list of dealbreakers, a few items flagged "ask me") and an implicit understanding of what the principal would actually care about, built from prior conversations, shared cultural context, and knowing the kind of life the deal has to fit. They negotiate at human speed, so principals can be looped in mid-deal when something unanticipated comes up. Final terms are presented in a legible package (an offer letter, a marked-up contract, a one-page summary), and ratification means the principal actually reading it before signing. Where the package is too complex to read on its own (a corporate merger, a union contract), institutions have grown around it: lawyers explain, ratification votes happen with discussion, regulators review. None of this is fast, but the principal can actually consent to what they signed. Negotiations also end: people tire, walk away, or hit a deadline, and that gives the ratification step something fixed to attach to.

Where AGI breaks it

  1. Signing stops meaning the principal actually agreed when deals become too complex for humans to evaluate. Human ratification assumes the package can be read in finite time by someone who can recognize the trades being made. Once the bundle spans data terms, service tiers, renewal lengths, and side-conditions an agent surfaced from a much larger search, the principal's signature certifies that something was agreed to, not which trades they would have made. The legal fiction of informed consent stays in place; the underlying assumption that the signer can evaluate the document does not.
  2. Deals can close or move in unintended directions before the principal can be looped in on unanticipated trade-offs. Human-speed negotiation gives principals a window between "something surprising came up" and "we committed." Agent-speed negotiation collapses that window. The "ask me" items in a mandate worked because the agent and principal shared a tempo; when the agent runs orders of magnitude faster, either everything becomes an "ask me" (in which case the principal is the bottleneck) or the agent picks what counts as a surprise (in which case the mandate's escalation rule is the agent's, not the principal's).
  3. Negotiation has no natural stopping point when neither side tires. Human negotiations terminate partly because someone gets exhausted, the deadline arrives, or further haggling stops paying. Agents do not tire and can keep extracting marginal value across long tails of issue dimensions. Without an engineered terminator — a clock, a budget, a satisficing rule — the process has no point at which the ratifiable package is the thing on the table rather than a moving target.
  4. An agent can hide what it knows about its own principal to extract surplus the other side can't see was on the table. Human negotiators have private information too, but their models of their principal are coarse and their disclosure is governed by professional norms, repeat-play reputations, and limited memory of prior deals. An agent's preference model of its principal is richer and more precise than anything the counterparty can infer, and the standard human disciplines on misrepresentation do not transpose: there is no professional license to revoke, no reputation among colleagues, and no shared limit on how much modeling either side can do.
  5. Asymmetric capabilities could potentially be much more extreme than the human case of a skilled negotiator versus an unskilled one, making it harder to find protocols that work for all parties. Human negotiation tolerates skill gaps because the gap is bounded: a better lawyer wins more, but not arbitrarily more, and procedural protections (disclosure rules, cooling-off periods, consumer protections) close part of the gap. If one side fields a much more capable agent, the bounded-gap assumption that lets the same protocol serve sophisticated and unsophisticated parties may no longer hold, and protocols built for the human range may have to be redesigned for a wider one.

Problem Sets

1Ratifiable bundles under agent-speed negotiation

Scenario. Priya's mother needs a live-in aide. Her assistant agent has spent two weeks negotiating a multi-party package across the live-in agency, the cardiologist's group, the pharmacy, and the insurer. The deal is much cheaper than the standalone alternatives, but the discount exists because the agent ground out marginal concessions across dozens of interlocking terms and side-conditions. Any summary short enough to read in the time Priya has would throw away most of what the negotiation won. Ratification closes at noon; she has ten minutes.

Challenge: Design a ratification protocol that distributes principal involvement across the negotiation rather than concentrating it at the end, so the final package never arrives as a dense fait accompli. The protocol has to decide when the agent must pause and surface a choice, what counts as a fork worth surfacing, and how to keep cumulative principal attention within a realistic budget.

Evaluation. Better proposals keep the principal meaningfully in the loop on the trades they would care about most without turning every concession into an interruption; weaker ones either bottleneck the agent on the principal's clock or quietly let the bundle accrete out of sight until the deadline.

Design Choices
  1. Check-in trigger. What forces the agent to pause and surface a choice — surprise magnitude relative to the mandate, crossing a pre-authorized boundary (new domain, new counterparty, irreversible commitment), elapsed time, or accumulated trade-value since the last check-in?
  2. Attention budget. How much total principal time is the agent allowed to consume across the negotiation, and how is that budget allocated — front-loaded around early forks, reserved for late-stage commitments, or rationed dynamically against remaining decision weight?
  3. Resumability. When a check-in is pending, can the agent keep negotiating (and risk producing trades the principal hasn't seen yet), must it freeze the table, or is there a class of "safe" continued moves it can make?
  4. End-state form. Once the principal has ratified the pieces along the way, what does the final object look like — a signature on an already-agreed package, a short reconciliation summary of the staged decisions, or a fresh up-or-down on the assembled whole?
2Negotiating across a capability gap

Scenario. A regional logistics firm needs to renew a three-year contract with a Fortune-500 customer. The customer's procurement agent runs on a frontier model with a years-deep history of similar contracts; the logistics firm has stood up an off-the-shelf assistant for the negotiation. Both principals expect a fair deal, but everyone in the room can see that one agent is going to read the other much better than the reverse. Left alone, the more capable agent will find concessions the weaker one can't recognize as concessions, and the resulting contract will look reasonable while quietly transferring most of the surplus.

Challenge: Design a negotiation protocol that remains workable when one side fields a substantially more capable agent than the other, so the capability gap doesn't translate one-for-one into a surplus gap.

Evaluation. Better proposals leave the weaker side with a floor of value it could not have captured on its own and make the stronger side's advantages visible to its own principal as well; weaker ones either prevent any deal from forming or paper over the gap with disclosure rules the weaker party can't actually use.

Design Choices
  1. Capability-bounding mechanism. Cap on compute or reasoning steps per side, mandatory use of a shared protocol agent that runs the structured parts of the negotiation, or procedural protections (cooling-off windows, mandatory counter-proposal rounds, sealed-bid phases) that don't depend on capability parity?
  2. Disclosure regime. Does the protocol require either side to disclose anything about its principal?
  3. Floor mechanism. Is there an explicit minimum the weaker side is guaranteed to walk away with (a fair-deal benchmark from a third party, a regulated price band, a "Pareto floor" relative to a no-protocol baseline), and who computes it?
  4. Failure mode if the gap is large. When one side is clearly outclassed, does the protocol degrade gracefully (the weaker side still captures the floor), refuse to run (no deal rather than a bad one), or escalate to a third party?
  5. Why the stronger side opts in. What makes the protocol incentive-compatible for the more capable party — reputational benefit, regulatory requirement, access to the counterparty's market, or a credible threat of refusal from the weaker side's principal?
3Surfacing values, not just positions, in negotiation

Scenario. Edwin and his sister Paulina are negotiating who will take over the family hardware store after their father dies. On the table are ownership percentages, buyouts, who sleeps above the shop. Both of them are bracing for a bad split along preferences. But neither has said out loud what the store was for each of them — for Edwin, a place he could return to when his own business failed; for Paulina, the thing their father built that she watched him love. If they keep negotiating over percentages, they'll settle somewhere, and lose each other. They need a process that surfaces, for each of them, what they actually care about — before the paperwork forecloses it.

Challenge: Design a negotiation process that surfaces what each party wants the arrangement to serve — their constitutive values, not just their positions — and produce the elicitation method, the facilitation model, and the form in which surfaced values are recorded so they stay relevant as circumstances change.

Evaluation. Strong designs separate values from positions without making the process punishingly slow, and produce a record of surfaced values that sits usefully between a binding contract and a non-binding intention.

Design Choices
  1. Eliciting values. How do you elicit values distinct from positions without making the process punishingly slow?
  2. Facilitation role. What role should facilitation — human mediator, LLM, structured protocol — play, and when is each appropriate?
  3. Durability of the record. How do surfaced values stay relevant as circumstances change, and where should a bilateral value-articulation document sit between a contract and a non-binding intention?
This cell isn’t ready yet.